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PARENTAL NOTIFICATION AS A 
PREREQUISITE FOR MINORS' ACCESS TO 
CONTRACEPTIVES: A BEHAVIORAL AND 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Minors have traditionally been assumed incapable of exercis-
ing complete control over their lives. The right to control minors' 
behavior has therefore been accorded to parents and to the state. 
As a consequence, the aQility of minors to exercise constitutional 
and statutory rights has been limited.1 
The regulation of minors' behavior by the state appreciably 
diminishes both minors' rights and parents' rights to control their 
children. Some state regulations, however, may unconstitu-
tionally infringe on the rights of minors and parents. In determin-
ing whether a particular state regulation is constitutional, it is 
necessary to balance the asserted state interest against minors' 
and parents' rights both separately and in combination. 
One recent development, the recognition of a constitutional 
"right of privacy" to make procreation-related decisions without 
state interference, reflects the special legal status of minors. 
Since Griswold v. Connecticut2 the Supreme Court has relied on 
' The special legal status of minors reflects the natural development of human beings 
from total inability to care for themselves to physical and psychological maturity. The 
Anglo-American legal tradition classified "children before the years of discretion" with 
lunatics: "[T]hey do not possess the faculty of forming a judgment on their own interests; 
in other words ... they are wanting in the first essential of an engagement by Contract." 
H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 164 (1st Amer. ed. 1870) (1st ed. London 1861). John Stuart Mill 
reflected the traditional view in a more general fashion: 
The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is 
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his inde-
pendence is, of right, absolute .... 
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply to 
human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, 
or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or 
womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care ofby others, 
must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. 
J.S. MILI., ON LIBERTY 9 (R. McCallum ed. 1946) (1st ed. London 1859). 
Consequently, minors' rights have been limited in such familiar areas as the power to 
vote, drink, or enter contracts; minors have also been subjected to other provisions for 
their welfare such as compulsory education laws, child labor laws, and a separate judicial 
system. 
2 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (a statute forbidding the use of contraceptives is unconstitu-
tionally broad and thus impermissibly invades the area of protected freedoms). 
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the right of privacy to limit the ability of the state to interfere 
with adults' decisions to use contraceptives3 or to obtain abor-
tions.4 The Court has also interpreted the right of privacy to 
provide some protection for minors' decisions even when the state 
regulation in question is intended to assist the exercise of parental 
authority.5 The Court, however, has not yet determined the ex-
tent to which parental rights encroach on the state's power to 
increase the scope of privacy rights which minors themselves may 
freely exercise. 
This article examines whether the constitutional right of par-
ents to determine what is best for their children prevents the state 
from permitting minors access to contraceptives without notify-
ing their parents.6 Part I examines the effect of the presence or 
absence of a notice requirement upon the interests of parents, 
minors, and the state. Part II reviews the development of the 
3 Id. at 484-86; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (right of privacy inheres 
in the individual, not the marital relationship). 
• Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of pri,acy encompasses a woman's decision 
whether to have an abortion). 
• Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (a state cannot impose a blanket 
requirement of parental consent as a condition for an unmarried minor's abortion during 
the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; the parental interest is "no more weighty than the right 
of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant." Id. at 74-
75). 
' This issue arose in Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich.), vacated and re-
manded mem., 559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir.), aff'd on remand, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 
1977), reu'd, No. 78-1056 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 1980). 
Doe was a class action brought by parents of unemancipated minors against the Ingham 
County Michigan health board and the Ingham County Family Planning Center to enjoin 
the Center from providing minors with contraceptive devices and medications without 
prior parental notification and consent. The Center operated on funds provided by the 
county health department and by the State of Michigan under a contract which required 
the Center to provide services to Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) and 
Medicaid recipients pursuant to the provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
601-644 & 1396-1396i (1976). The Act provides for the availability of family planning 
services to program recipients, including sexually active minors. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(15), 
1396a(a)(8), & 1396d(a)(4)(c) (1976). 
The Ingham County Family Planning Center served minors who voluntarily sought its 
services on a confidential basis. The minors were required to attend a "rap session" before 
any further services were made available. After a discussion of aspects of sexual activity 
and methods and risks of birth control, minors made appointments for medical examina-
tions. Contraceptives were furnished to the minors only if the examination showed no 
radical problems. 
The district court held that the Center's procedures for the distribution of contracep-
tives violated the parents' fundamental "right of privacy in the care and control of their 
minor children and a right to the free exercise of their religion in the spiritual education 
of their children." 428 F. Supp. at 1206. The court concluded that the parents' interests 
in controlling their children and in the freedom of the family from state intrusion out-
weighed both any right of privacy of minors and any state interests served by confidential 
provision of contraceptives. Therefore, the state could not constitutionally exclude parents 
completely from the child's decision to use contraceptives. Id. at 1214-15. See also Doe v. 
Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247, 1261 (W.D. Mich. 1977). 
For an account of the Sixth Circuit's reversal, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1980, at A12, 
col. 6. 
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constitutional right of privacy and the impact of parental rights 
and state interests on the extension of privacy rights to minors. 
Part ill considers the manner in which the interests of minors, 
parents, and the state should be balanced. The article concludes 
that statutes requiring prior parental notification of minors' deci-
sions to procure contraceptives do not effectively protect parental 
or state interests and unconstitutionally burden the minors' right 
of privacy. 
I. INTERESTS AFFECTED BY STATE INVOLVEMENT 
The rights of parents which are affected by the provision of 
contraceptives to minors are not absolute. In order to be vindi-
cated, those rights must be weighed against the independent in-
terests and rights of the state and minors which have been ac-
knowledged by the Supreme Court.7 The basis of the rights as-
serted in this area is a desire to affect - or control - the behavior 
of minors. The weights of the asserted rights in any confrontation 
are determined primarily by the degree to which the measures 
which are justified by any claim of right can influence the actual 
behavior of parents and minors. This section examines the rela-
tionships between individuals' sexual behavior, access to contra-
ceptives, and the values and interests sought to be protected by 
parental notification requirements. 
A. Parental and Familial Interests 
The family occupies a central position in American society. As 
a mechanism for teaching social values, it serves as the primary 
means by which society maintains its cultural identity.8 The per-
formance of this social function requires that parents should bear 
certain responsibilities and be free to exercise a great discretion 
in decisions regarding their children's upbringing. The existence 
of family autonomy requires, inter alia, that parent-child dis-
putes are decided by whatever procedures that individual fami-
lies develop, rather than by socially determined procedures or 
institutions. Since parents and children are not social or legal 
equals, recognition of a sphere of family automony or privacy 
implies state support, generally through non-intervention, of par-
ental control of their children's behavior. Despite the obvious 
1 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
214 (1972). For a discussion of ~der, see notes 95-97 and accompanying text infra. 
8 K. DEUTSCH, POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 161 (1970); Hafen, Children's Liberation and 
the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 
1976 BRIGHAM YOUNG L. REV. 605, 615-17 (1976). 
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parental domination of the family, children share the parents' 
interest in maintaining the family's independence from state su-
pervision. This interest results in part from individuals' desire for 
autonomy and in part from the recognition that "law is incapable 
of effectively managing, except in a very gross sense, so delicate 
and complex a relationship as that between parent and child."' 
For example, parental authority and autonomy over their chil-
dren's religious education is a product of many factors. One factor 
is society's reliance on the family as the source of general moral 
education. Another is the protection afforded the exercise of reli-
gious beliefs. A third factor is resistance to the possibility that the 
state might "standardize" children by controlling certain aspects 
of their education under the guise of parens patriae. 10 
The provision of contraceptives to minors clearly affects these 
parental interests in controlling the ~ligious education and the 
sexual and contraceptive choices of the child. The availability of 
contraceptives from an official source necessarily implies a degree 
of official approval of their use. Thus, such availability may be 
interpreted by minors as official approval of their sexual activities 
rather than as an officially neutral attitude or a recognition by 
the state that it cannot control minors' sexual activity. Parents 
may understandably believe that this type of state support un-
dermines parental authority by inculcating values relating to 
marriage and sexual activity, particularly the use of contracep-
tives, which may conflict with the values preferred by the par-
ents. 
Parental values in the sensitive areas of premarital sexual ac-
tivity and contraception may be closely related to those parental 
values associated with religious beliefs. For example, parents who 
disapprove of their children's sexual activity may oppose their 
use of contraceptives on the basis of a general opposition to con-
traceptives or a belief that the minors are more likely to refrain 
from sexual activity if contraceptives are unavailable. Other par-
ents may be equally condemnatory of their children's sexual ac-
tivities but may take the view that, ultimately, they have no 
opportunity for immediate input into or control over the chil-
dren's decision to have sex and that the wisest course is to mini-
mize any further dangers by providing contraceptives to sexually 
active minors. 
• J. GoLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BF.ST INTEREsTS OF THE CHILD 8 
(1973). 
•• See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,232 (1972) (Amish parents could withdraw 
their children from public schools at age fourteen, despite a state law requiring children's 
attendance until age sixteen); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (state 
could not prevent parents from sending their children to private schools). 
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All four groups of parents would nonetheless share an interest 
in protecting the health of their children by participating in the 
choice of a particular method of birth control. The different 
methods of birth control vary in effectiveness, ease of use, and 
associated medical consequences. 11 The contraceptive pill, tht 
most effective and popular method, 12 has been reported to in-
crease the risk of a variety of medical problems. In addition, the 
long-term effects of using the pill during adolescence before the 
establishment of a regular menstrual cycle are unknown." The 
necessary weighing of the medical risks and benefits of the alter-
native methods of treatment is precisely the sort of decision that 
parents have traditionally had the right to make for their minor 
children. 15 
Thus, the state's providing contraceptives on a confidential 
basis to minors threatens parental authority and control and the 
parent-child relationship in a more pervasive manner than 
merely contradicting parental preferences about sex and contra-
ceptives.18 The state's implicit questioning of the value of paren-
tal guidance in the sensitive area of sexual mores challenges par-
ental authority as based on inadequate knowledge or on archaic 
values. A minor might infer from the state's position that parents 
who disagree with the minor's wishes have chosen their position 
on a basis other than the minor's best interests. Furthermore, 
confidential distribution of contraceptives implies that deception 
of one's parents is sometime justifiable. A state program such as 
the one attacked in Doe v. Irwin 11 relies on a state agent, who has 
11 The effectiveness of different contraceptive methods may vary widely due to proper 
or improper use, and may therefore be especially dependent on the quality of the medical 
advice received by the user. 
12 Over 85% of the patients receiving contraceptives from family planning clinics in 
Michigan from January to June 1974 used the pill. R. CARTER & C. NELL, FAMILY PLANNING 
SERVICES PROVIDED TO AFDC RECIPIENTS IN MICHIGAN 72 (Studies in Welfare Policy No. 6 
1975). 
is Possible side effects of the pill include nausea, vaginal discharges, depression, inflam-
mation of veins, and blood clotting. Other methods involve different risks. Intra-uterine 
devices (IUDs) may cause irregular bleeding, pelvic pain, and infection or perforation of 
the uterus. H. KATCHADOURIAN & D. LUNDE, FUNDAMENTALS OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 151-67 
(2d ed. 1975). 
" See generally H. KATCHADOURIAN & D. LUNDE, supra note 13, at 151-56. 
•• W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 102-03 (4th ed. 1971). See generally 
Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk of State Supervention of Parental 
Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977); Pilpel, Minors' Rights to Medical Care, 36 ALB. L. 
REv. 462 (1972); Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The 
Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001 (1975). 
" From the parents' viewpoint, the involvement of the state may be more threatening 
than the actions of a private individual or organization lacking the authoritative image 
of the state. 
17 See note 6 supra. 
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only a brief acquaintance with a minor, to replace to some extent 
the minor's parents as a source of values and counsel. Parents, 
however, are generally far more familiar with their children's 
level of maturity and background than is anyone else. It is doubt-
ful that these challenges to parental authority can be limited in 
practice to the medical aspects of the minor's contraceptive deci-
sion. Religious values are necessarily involved in decisions about 
sex and contraception, but if parents are not notified prior to the 
decision they may have no opportunity to counsel the child about 
the intricacies of an actual sexual relationship. While the decision 
to involve the parents would ultimately be the child's, the offer 
of a state-supported alternative decreases the likelihood that a 
minor will turn to his or her parents for assistance. An expert has 
testified that "young people who come for contraceptives may 
come for other reasons, also. That is, they really want help. They 
want emotional help. They want help with other problems, and 
that their sex relations that they are having are simply sympto-
matic of rather deep-seated, sometimes, emotional problems."18 
The connection between sexual activities and a wide range of 
other concerns suggests that it is difficult for minors to separate 
the decision whether to use contraceptives from the decision 
whether to engage in sex, or to separate medical concerns from 
the religious and moral issues involved. 
B. Minors' Interests 
The interests of minors in obtaining contraceptives must be 
examined within the overall context of their sexual activity. Al-
though both male and female minors engage in sexual relations 
and are affected by the consequences of their behavior, the practi-
cal impact of minors' sexual activity is much greater on females 
than on males. 19 
Approximately 1,000,000 females between the ages of fifteen 
and nineteen become pregnant each year. 20 Those females consti-
tute about ten percent of all women, and twenty-five percent of 
the sexually active women, in that age group. Another 30,000 
females under the age of fifteen become pregnant each year. 21 Of 
" Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198, 1204 (W.D. Mich.), vacated and remanded mem., 
559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir.), aff'd on remand, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977), rev'd, 
No. 78-1056 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 1980). 
11 Card & Wise, Teenage Mothers and Teenage Fathers: The Impact of Early Childbear-
ing on the Parents' Personal and Professional Lives, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 199 
(1978). 
20 Jaffe & Dryfoos, Fertility Control Services for Adolescents: Access and Utilization, 8 
FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 167, 167 (1976). 
"Id. 
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those pregnancies in teenagers between the ages of fifteen and 
nineteen, two-thirds are unintended, and about sixty percent re-
sult in live births. 22 One-third of the children born to minor 
women are illegitimate.23 It is estimated that approximately 
2,000,000 sexually active teenaged females do not use any reliable 
method of contraception.2• Pregnancy, childbirth, and the use of 
medical contraceptives present risks to every woman's health. 
The fatality rate associated with pregnancy and childbirth among 
minors, however, is approximately five times that associated with 
the use of contraceptives and legal, first-trimester abortions. 25 
The births of illegitimate children often have a severe impact 
on teenage mothers. In addition to the possibility of social stigma 
attaching to both mother and child, possible consequences in-
clude early and unstable marriages and subsequent pregnancies, 26 
emotional difficulties, financial problems, and interruption or 
cessation of the mother's education. 27 The difficulties which 
unwed mothers face in attempting to support themselves and 
their children are reflected by their disproportionate claim on 
social service payments. 28 
In light of the scope of these repercussions, minors who attempt 
to avoid teenage pregnancy and its problems cannot be said to act 
irresponsibly. On the contrary, those sexually active minors who 
seek birth control information act more responsibly than those 
" Id. See also Zelnick & Kantner, First Pregnancies to Women Aged 15-19: 1976 and 
1971, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 11, 13 (1978). 
n Jaffe & Dryfoos, supra note 20. 
" Id. at 172 (table 10). 
21 Tietze, New Estimates of Mortality Associated with Fertility Control, 9 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSPECTIVES 74, 75-76 (1977). 
11 Approximately 60% of marriages resulting from such pregnancies end within six 
years. Furthermore, about 50% of teenaged mothers have a second pregnancy within 
thirty-six months of their first delivery. Furstenberg, The Social Consequences of Teenage 
Parenthood, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 148, 155-58 (1976). See also McCarthy & Menken, 
Marriage, Remarriage, Marital Disruption and Age at First Birth, 11 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSPECTIVES 21 (1979). 
17 These consequences are also likely to be interdependent. Card & Wise, supra note 
19; Furstenberg, supra note 26; Moore & Waite, Early Childbearing and Educational 
Attainment, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 220 (1977); Trussell, Economic Consequences of 
Teenage Childbearing, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 184 (1976). 
11 Households including a woman who bore her first child as a teenage mother received 
$4.65 billion of the $9.4 billion distributed by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
program (AFDC) in 1975. Further, 61% of the women in AFDC households between the 
ages of fourteen and thirty bore their first child while still in their teens. This compares 
with a rate of 35% in non-AFDC households. Sixty percent of illegitimate children are 
supported by welfare payments. Moore, Teenage Childbirth and Welfare Dependency, 10 
FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 233, 234 (1978); Moore & Caldwell, The Effect of Government 
Policies on Out-of-Wedlock Sex and Pregnancy, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 164, 165 
(1977). 
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who do not. 29 But the imposition of a notice requirement on the 
distribution of contraceptives would not induce minors who are 
not receiving birth control services to seek them. 30 The converse 
is more likely true. Although a notice requirement may not for-
mally give parents the right to determine whether minors receive 
contraceptives, it may deter minors from seeking contraceptives 
or allow parents to bring other pressures to bear in order to control 
their children's sexual or contraceptive decisions. 
A sexually active minor has a clear interest in obtaining accur-
ate information on the medical aspects of contraception and 
effective means of preventing pregnancy. Insofar as this decision 
depends on medical expertise, a knowledgeable medically-trained 
advisor is a preferable source of information. Few parents possess 
comparable expertise. The minor therefore is medically better off 
with access to advice and contraceptives which is unobstructed 
by the intervention of non-medical values. 30 
The minor's desire for confidentiality is motivated by his or her 
natural inclination toward personal autonomy and the shared 
interest in maintaining family relationships with minimal gov-
ernment intervention. The problems caused by a minor's sexual 
behavior arise at a time when the development of her separate 
identity subjects parent-child relations to numerous strains.31 A 
notice requirement may force minors to discuss sexual matters 
with their parents at a time and in a context neither desired nor 
prepared for by parents or children. 
These tensions and communication difficulties exist in "good" 
parent-child relationships as well as in relationships where lack 
" A survey of minors' use of contraceptives in 1975 found that of an estimated four 
million sexually active teenage women, 1.2 million received contraceptive services from 
family planning clinics, and estimated that an approximately equal number were served 
by private sources. Dryfoos & Heisler, Contraceptive Services for Adolescents: An 
Overview, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 223,223,229 (1978). Another study found that more 
than 80% of teenage women seeking contraceptive services from clinics had been sexually 
active for more than one year before they first sought a clinic's services. Akpom, Akpom 
& Davis, Prior Sexual Behavior of Teenagers Attending Rap Sessions for the First Time, 
8 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 203, 204 (1976). 
'° Parents' general lack of medical expertise does not, of course, mean that their advice 
to children on related medical and non-medical issues is worthless. In some instances, 
parents may have knowledge of the child's relevant medical history which the child lacks. 
To the extent that a medical decision involves non-medical considerations, parents may 
be as competent and able to advise their children objectively as a medical expert who Jacka 
their familiarity with the child's particular characteristics and general maturity. Parents, 
however, may lack the objectivity and ability to consider alternatives which a less 
emotionally-involved counselor may possess. Opportunities for confidential medical ex- · 
aminations and counseling, as part of a clinic's program, may also yield additional bene-
fits in related areas, such as veneral disease prevention and treatment. 
" See L. STONE & J. CHURCH, CHILDHOOD & ADOLESCENCE 432-38, 460, 481-86 (3d ed. 
1973). 
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of rapport and trust deter minors from confiding in their parents. 
The closeness and overall strength of the parent-child bond may 
cause a sexually active minor to believe she has failed her parents 
and betrayed their trust, just as her parents might believe the 
child's sexual activity or pregnancy indicates that they have 
failed her. Sexual matters are often difficult to discuss, regardless 
of the quality of the relationship between the speaker and lis-
tener. Any of these factors may cause a child who is otherwise 
open with her parents to avoid discussing her sexual activity with 
them especially if she is uncertain how they would react. 
The individual autonomy desired by a minor includes the 
rights to develop moral and religious values and control of sexual 
behavior. Values are derived from many sources, including one's 
parents, but the choice of a belief by a person of any age must 
ultimately be that person's to make. The interest in determining 
which sources may influence a minor's choice of values belongs 
to the minor as well as the parents. But the consequences of the 
minor's sexual activity fall primarily on the minor, not on the 
parents. In addition, the minor's choice of sexual values, as dis-
tinguished from values relating to contraception, will affect the 
minor's behavior in a way that is almost uniformly uncontrolled 
(although not uninfluenced) by parents. Although parents may 
have expended much time and energy attempting to teach a child 
to behave in certain ways, when sexual values are actually imple-
mented, the capacity to choose is solely the minor's. The indirect 
nature of parental control of children's sexual activity raises the 
question of whether and to what extent parental notice or control 
of access to contraceptives actually aids parental control of mi-
nors' sexual values and conduct. 
Parental notice and consent requirements and flat prohibitions 
on access to contraceptives share certain functional characteris-
tics. If parental notice or consent is required, minors who are 
unwilling to confront their parents with their activities are essen-
tially faced with the same choice posed by a ban on access - to 
discontinue their sexual activities, to rely on non-medical contra-
ceptive methods, or to assume the risk of pregnancy. Minors who 
do consult with their parents pursuant to a notice or consent law 
may face effective parental opposition or supervision through for-
mal withholding of consent or more informal pressure. A notice 
requirement is more permissive than a consent requirement only 
with regard to minors who are both willing to inform their parents 
and to risk disapproval and coercion in order to obtain contracep-
tives. It is likely that most teenagers would not seek contracep-
tives from a source which notified parents of that fact unless the 
adolescents were already willing to discuss their sexual activity 
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and contraception with their parents. In those cases, the notice 
requirement is likely to be superfluous. In cases where the minor 
and parents disagree, a notice requirement would increase poten-
tial parental control over subsequent behavior only if the minor 
were willing to risk parental disapproval to obtain contraceptives 
or if the minor is deterred from sexual activity by the unavailabil-
ity of contraceptives. 
The observed relationship between adolescent sexual activity 
and use of contraceptives supports the proposition that a notice 
requirement would do little to aid parental control of sexual be-
havior. The availability of contraceptives does not appear to af-
fect the overall frequency of sexual activity among minors.32 The 
decision to use contraceptives generally does not precede but 
rather follows by a considerable period a minor's initial sexual 
experience.33 In most instances, therefore, a minor recognizes the 
need for contraceptives well after the optimal period for parental 
involvement and guidance. 
The only study this author has found which has attempted to 
assess the impact of a parental notice requirement indicates that 
a notice requirement would not significantly affect minors' sexual 
activity or increase parental knowledge or control.34 The study 
found that the parents of fifty-five percent of the minors surveyed 
knew of the minor's use of the services of family planning clinics. 
An additional nine percent of the respondents said that if a notice 
requirement were imposed they would continue to attend the 
clinics and inform their parents. Four percent said a notice re-
quirement would cause them to cease their sexual activities 
rather than inform their parents. Twenty percent would stop 
using the clinic's services, but would use a non-prescription con-
traceptive, and twelve percent said they would continue their 
activities but cease using contraceptives. 
Although the results of this survey are not conclusive, they 
challenge the basic premise of ·a notice requirement, that minors 
will not discuss their sexual activities with their parents unless 
forced to do so by the state. The survey also indicates that the 
efficacy of a notice requirement is limited as an incentive to 
•• Akpom, Akpom & Davis, supra note 29, at 206. 
ss See, e.g., Akpom, Akpom & Davis, supra note 29; Cutwright, Illegitimacy: Myths, 
Causes and Cures, 3 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 25 (1971); Jaffe & Dryfoos, supra note 20; 
Moore & Caldwell, supra note 28; Settlage, Baroff & Cooper, Sexual Experience of 
Younger Teenage Girls Seeking Contraceptive Assistance for the First Time, 5 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSPECTIVES 223 (1973). 
"' Akpom, Akpom & Davis, supra note 29; Settlage, Baroff & Cooper, supra note 33; 
Zelnick & Kantner, Sexual and Contraceptive Experience of Young Unmarried Women 
in the United States, 1976 and 1971, 9 FAM. PLAN PERSPECTIVES 55 (1977). 
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greater intrafamily communication. Of the forty-five percent of 
the minors who it was reported had not informed their parents, 
only nine percent believed they would begin discussing their sex-
ual behavior with their parents. That potential gain should be 
balanced against the greater number (twelve percent) who re-
sponded that they would simply stop using contraceptives.35 
C. The State's Interests 
The state has two interests which are affected by minors' access 
to contraceptives. The first is the reconciliation and protection of 
the individual and familial interests of minors and parents. The 
second is the maintenance of desired social attitudes toward sex-
ual behavior and the minimization of the social costs of adoles-
cent sexual activity. 
The state interests that might favor imposition of a parental 
notice requirement are primarily, although not exclusively, based 
on the same considerations which lead the state to place primary 
responsibility for child-rearing with parents. To fulfill that re-
sponsibility, the state must act to support rather than to under-
cut the actions and authority of its chosen agents. Such support 
may also protect the state's interest in maintaining the family as 
a fundamental social unit. Furthermore, since limitations on 
minors' rights are based on the presumption of their lesser capac-
ity to make informed, mature decisions, the involvement of par-
ents in the decision-making process may increase the probability 
of those preferable choices. 
The state may also desire to foster certain values regarding 
sexual behavior and to deter premarital and/or promiscuous sex-
ual activity among minors through a notice requirement. The 
achievement of these goals would depend on the nature and 
strength of any causal relationships between minors' sexual activ-
ity, the availability of contraceptives, and parental knowledge 
and oversight of minors' behavior. Regardless of whether a notice 
requirement is justified on the basis of parental rights alone or in 
15 Torres, Does Your Mother Know . .. ?, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 280 (1978). The 
survey covered the responses of 1,442 single females under the age of eighteen attending 
fifty-three family planning clinics in Arizona, California, Illinois, Missouri, New York, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Washington. 
The Ingham County Family Planning Center, one of the defendants in Doe v. Irwin, 
estimates that during the period of approximately three months in 1975 in which the 
district court's injunction requiring parental notice was in effect before the stay pending 
appeal, clinic attendance by minors dropped to between 10% to 20% of its former level. 
Telephone conversation with Ms. Ann Olesak, Family Planning Educator, Ingham County 
Family Planning Center, Michigan. 
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combination with the state's interests, the requirement would 
affect minors in the same manner. 
If the state is willing to distribute contraceptives to minors, it 
may be neutral as to whether or not a minor receives and uses 
them. The state cannot, however, be neutral as to who has the 
right to make the final decision whether or not to use contracep-
tives. If minors have that right then the procedures by which they 
exercise it should not be set up in a manner which unnecesssarily 
deters sexually active minors from receiving contraceptives with- · 
out by the same token increasing parental abilities to protect 
minors, or achieving other important social goals. Such proce-
dures would undermine the effectiveness of the state's policy 
without furthering its goal of protecting minors and society from 
undesired consequences of their actions; the available evidence 
indicates that the state's policies with respect to contraceptives 
and abortion affect only the rates of adolescent pregnancies and 
childbirth but do not affect overall sexual activity. 38 
The costs to the state of sexual activity of minors include the 
costs to the minors - illegitimate births, venereal disease, the 
loss of social productivity by individuals forced to interrupt or 
forego education - and the costs of supporting those young moth-
ers and their children who receive welfare payments. The finan-
cial expense of the delivery and care of an AFDC recipient for one 
year is approximately fourteen times the cost of the family plan-
ning services needed to avert one birth.37 The state's interest ii:t 
the welfare of minors and in protecting society as a whole against 
such burdens are advanced by maximizing the voluntary use of 
contraceptives by sexually active minors. 
The impact of a notice requirement on family relationships 
depends on the use of family planning services by minors who are 
willing to allow the state to notify parents of their actions al-
though not willing to confront their parents directly. Regardless 
of what minors' rights to engage in sex or to use contraceptives 
are, minors generally are able to keep their sexual activities secret 
from their parents. The absence of a notice requirement would 
11 Moore & Caldwell, supra note 18 at 165, 168. 
37 R. CARTER & C. NELL, supra note 12, at 45. Another source has estimated the annual 
cost of providing effective contraceptive services at $66 per client. Moore, supra note 28. 
One study concluded that the $584 million invested from 1970 to 1975 by the federal 
government in family planning programs resulted in short-term savings to government 
health and welfare services of $1.1 billion. Eighty percent of the savings were derived from 
the costs of pregnancy-related medical care, and twenty percent represented savings from 
the costs of public assistance. Long-term savings and benefits were not included in the 
study. Jaffe & Cutright, Short-Term Benefits and Costs of U.S. Family Planning 
Programs, 1970-75, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 77, 80 (1977). 
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not prevent either parents or minors from discussing sexual or 
contraceptive issues within the family. Since the availability of 
confidential treatment generally does not have a causal relation 
to minors' sexual activities, a notice requirement would rarely 
support parental authority or control in an effective manner. 
However, given the strong probability of a deterrent effect of a 
notice requirement, the state's interests in minimizing undesira-
ble consequences of minors' sexual activities with minimal inter-
ference in family affairs indicates that a policy of confidentiality 
best serves those state interests. 
II. THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS AND MINORS 
The recognition of a constitutional right of privacy which pro-
tects individual decisions regarding procreation implies some ex-
tension of that right to minors. The extent of minors' privacy 
rights has thus far been only partially defined by the United 
States Supreme Court. The hesitation to extend to minors the 
same privacy right accorded adults reflects both the gradual de-
velopment of the right of privacy itself and the traditional view 
that state regulations may limit minors' rights to a greater degree 
than adults' rights. Minors' rights have also been viewed as neces-
sarily limited by the authority of parents to control their children, 
although parental rights have usually been considered in the con-
text of parent-state competition for control of minors rather than 
in direct parent-child conflicts. 
A. The Right of Privacy 
The freedom of individuals to decide whether to conceive or 
bear children has been increasingly protected against state regu-
lation since 1965 by the recognition of a fundamental constitu-
tional right of privacy. Griswold u. Connecticut38 began this pro-
cess by invalidating a state statute which prohibited the use of 
contraceptives, as the statute applied to suppliers of contracep-
tives who were convicted as accessories. The Supreme Court em-
phasized the social importance of the marital relationship and 
the unacceptability of intrusion into "the sacred precincts of the 
marital bedroom" to enforce the prohibition.39 The source of con-
stitutional protection for the right of privacy was identified by the 
Court as the "penumbras" of the specific protections embodied 
33 381 U.S. 479 (1965) . 
., Id . . at 485-86. 
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in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. 40 
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
used by the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird'1 to extend to single 
adults the same right of access to contraceptives as married per-
sons have. The Court identified the right of privacy as an individ-
ual rather than a relational right: 
[W]hatever the rights of the individual to access to con-
traceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the 
unmarried and the married alike .... It is true that in 
Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the 
marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an inde-
pendent entity . . . but an association of two individuals 
. . . . If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right 
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child.42 
The fundamental nature of the right of privacy was emphasized 
by the Court in Roe v. Wade. 43 The Court clarified the source of 
the right as the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal 
liberty and noted that it extends to decisions about marital and 
family relationships, procreation, contraception, child rearing, 
and education.4' Roe struck down a Texas statute which outlawed 
abortions other than those necessary to save the mother's life. 
The Court stated that the right of privacy included the woman's 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 45 Thus, it 
concluded that any state regulations limiting the exercise of that 
discretion must be narrowly drawn and justified by a compelling 
state interest. 48 
The opinion identified three important state interests: protect-
ing the mother's health, maintaining medical standards, and pro-
tecting potential life. 47 The state interests involved were balanced 
•• Id. at 484. The concurring opinions cited other constitutional sources of the privacy 
right, e.g., the Ninth Amendment as protective of a fundamental right of privacy, id. at 
498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring), and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) & 502 (White, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
" 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
" Id. at 453 (citations omitted). 
" 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
" Id. at 152-53. 
"Id. at 153. 
" Id. at 153-55. 
" Id. at 154. 
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against the relative dangers to the mother from abortion and 
childbirth. The Court found that the state's interest in the 
mother's health does not become compelling until the risks of 
childbirth are at least equal to the risks of abortion, while its 
interest in protecting potential life becomes compelling only 
when the fetus "presumably has the capacity for meaningful life 
outside the mother's womb." 48 The Court's reliance on then-
current medical knowledge to balance and define those risks and 
interests49 implies that the extent of the individual's privacy right 
and the state's ability to regulate the abortion decision may 
change as developments in medical science alter the relative risks 
of abortion and childbirth. The Court also held, however, that the 
state did not have a legitimate interest in imposing a moral view 
upon women through regulation of the abortion decision.50 
Eisenstadt and Roe clearly establish that adults possess a fun-
damental right of privacy protecting their choices whether to con-
ceive and bear children. Furthermore, any regulations limiting 
that right must take into acount the medical risks involved in 
order not to intrude upon the protected area. 51 
B. The Rights of Minors 
The law has traditionally restricted minors' rights and activi-
ties more than those of adults. Such restrictions have been justi-
fied by a belief that minors lack the maturity necessary to under-
stand the consequences of their actions.52 The restrictions placed 
on their activities represent both attempts to protect minors from 
themselves, e.g., limits on minors' ability to contract, drink, or 
drive, and to prepare minors to function effectively as adult citi-
zens, e.g., compulsory education.53 
'" Id. at 163-64. 
" Id . 
.. "[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the 
rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake." Id. at 162. The state, however, need not 
be neutral, according to the Court. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Court held 
that a state's refusal to fund elective abortions for indigent women through Medicaid did 
not violate equal protection. Roe v. Wade was interpreted by the Court to have 
"implie[d] no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring 
childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public 
funds." 432 U.S. at 474. 
51 "[Al governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject 
to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and 
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 
(1963), quoted in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
•• See note 1 supra. 
53 See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS or 
THE CHILD (1973); Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reser-
vations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 BRIG. YouNG L. REv. 605 (1976); 
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The constitutional rights of minors can only be discerned by 
balancin,:,; the express language of the constitution, which does 
not distinguish between adults and minors, and the common law 
tradition of according limited rights to minors. The Supreme 
Court has been most active in defining and extending the due 
process rights of minors. It has also been active in judging minors' 
First Amendment claims, holding that minors' lack of the "full 
capacity for individual choice" justifies restrictions on their First 
Amendment rights. 55 It has not, however, interpreted the due 
process clause as providing protections to minors equal to those 
which it provides to adults. The Court recently summarized its 
ruling on minors' rights as having "recognized three reasons justi-
fying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children 
cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability 
of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an in-
formed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role 
in child-rearing."58 
The Court has, furthermore, dealt with minors' rights of access 
to abortions and contraceptives in the recent cases of Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth57 and Carey v. Population Services 
International. 58 In Roe v. Wade, the Court had expressly refused 
Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, their Parents, and the State (pts. I-III), 
4 FAM. L.Q. 320, 410 (1970), 5 FAM. L.Q. 64 (1971); Note, State Instrusion Into Family 
Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1383 (1974). 
" See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring notice and hearing before 
temporary disciplinary suspension from school); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 
(1971) (denying constitutional right to jury trial in the adjudicative phase of state juvenile 
court proceedings); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (setting reasonable doubt standard 
for conviction of a juvenile in a criminal prosecution); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) 
(providing right to written notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and privilege 
against self-incrimination in juvenile court adjudications). The court noted in In re Gault, 
however, that juvenile delinquency hearings need not "'conform with all the require-
ments of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing.'" Id. at 30 (footnote 
omitted). 
" Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in result). 
Ginsberg upheld a New York statute barring the sale to minors of sexually-oriented litera-
ture that concededly was not obscene with respect to adults. The Court rejected the 
argument that the statute unconstitutionally defined obscenity and, therefore, the scope 
of minors' freedom of expression on the basis of the buyer's age. The statute's restrictions 
of. minors' rights were held justified by the state's power to regulate minors to a greater 
extent than adults, its interest in supporting parental authority, and the state's indepen-
dent interest in minors' welfare. Id. at 638-40. But see Tinker v. Des Moines School 
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding students' right of free speech under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments if such expression does not materially and substantially interfere 
with the school's operation). 
51 Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3043 (1979). For a discussion of Bellotti, see notes 
70-79 and accompanying text infra . 
• , 428 us. 52 (1976) . 
.. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
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to consider the extent of unmarried minors' rights in an abortion 
decision. 59 Danforth concerned the constitutionality of a statute 
prohibiting abortions, other than those necessary to save the 
mother's life, from being performed on women under the age of 
eighteen during the first trimester of pregnancy without the par-
ents' written consent. The Court recognized that the state's inter-
est in protecting parental authority and family stability might 
provide a basis for greater regulation of minors' abortions than 
the regulation rejected for adults in Roe. Nevertheless, the Court 
found fault with the statute's delegation to parents of an 
"absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" power that the state it-
self, under Roe, did not possess. 80 It further found that 
"significant state interest" in maintaining the family and paren-
tal authority did not justify the statute's restrictions on minors. 
The Court was not convinced that parental control of the abortion 
decision could effectively protect that interest: "Neither is it 
likely that such veto power will enhance parental authority or 
control where the minor and the nonconsenting parent are so 
fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy 
already has fractured the family structure."81 The Court rejected 
the argument that parental interests might support the statute's 
requirements: "Any independent interest the parent may have in 
the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more 
weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature 
enough to have become pregnant."82 The Court refused, however, 
to hold that the privacy right of minors is equal to that of adults: 
"We emphasize that our holding ... does not suggest that every 
minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent 
for termination of her pregnancy."83 
In the companion case of Bellotti v. Baird84 the lower court had 
invalidated a Massachusetts statute requiring parental consent 
or an order from the state superior court before a minor could 
obtain an abortion.85 The Supreme Court indicated that it was 
willing to accept as constitutional some state-mandated parental 
involvement in the minor's abortion decision. It also indicated, 
however, than an absolute parental notice or consultation re-
quirement might not be upheld. The court observed that the 
•• 410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67. 
80 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
" Id. at 75. 
" Id. 
" Id. 
" 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 
" Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975), vacated and remanded, 428 U.S. 
52 (1976). 
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interpretation advanced by the State of Massachusetts was that 
the statute 
prefers parental consultation and consent, but . . . per-
mits a mature minor capable of giving informed consent 
to obtain, without undue burden, an order permitting the 
abortion without parental consultation, and, further, per-
mits even a minor incapable of giving informed consent to 
obtain an order without parental consultation where there 
is a showing that the abortion would be in her best inter-
ests. The statute, as thus read would be fundamentally 
different from a statute that creates a "parental veto". 66 
Since the Court found the statute open to varying constructions, 
it remanded the case to the district court with instructions to 
refer the issues of construction to the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court. 67 
That court construed the statute to require parental notice of 
all proceedings instituted by minors seeking judicial consent to 
abortions. 68 The district court again invalidated the statute, hold-
ing in part that the absolute notice requirement impermissibly 
burdened minors' rights by prohibiting judicial consent to abor-
tions without parental notification even when the court found 
that parental involvement would not be in the minor's best inter-
ests. 69 
In Bellotti v. Baird, 70 the Supreme Court affirmed that judg-
ment. Justice Powell's plurality opinion noted the reasons for the 
greater latitude allowed to state regulation of minors' rights71 and 
recognized the frequent requirement of parental involvement or 
consent in important decisions by minors as an appropriate 
method of protecting minors from their own immaturity. 72 How-
ever, the differences between other choices made by minors sub-
ject to state regulation, e.g., the decision to marry, and the consti-
tutional status of the right involved in Baird "require a State to 
act with particular sensitivity when it legislates to foster parental 
" 428 U.S. at 145 (footnote omitted). 
" Id. at 146-52. 
" Baird v. Attorney General,_ Mass.-, 360 N.E.2d 288, 294 (1977). 
" Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (D. Mass. 1978), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979). 
1
• Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979). Justice Powell announced the Court's judg-
ment in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. 
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
and Blackmun. Justice White was the sole dissenter. 
71 See text accompanying note 56 supra. 
12 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3045 & 3047 (1979). 
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involvement in this matter."73 Danforth's prohibition of any abso-
h1te third party veto over the abortion decision led Justice Powell 
to the conclusion that when a state requires minors to obtain 
parental consent to abortions, it must also provide an alternate 
authorization procedure through which minors may procure abor-
tions.7' 
Justice Powell found the judicial proceeding provided by the 
Massachusetts statute unsatisfactory in two respects. One aspect 
found defective by both Justice Powell's and Justice Stevens' 
plurality opinions was the authority given to the superior court 
to deny consent for an abortion on the grounds that the abortion 
would not be in the minor's best interests even if the judge deter-
mined that the minor was mature and was capable of making and 
had made a reasonable and informed choice. Both pluralities say 
that this potential judicial disregard of a mature minor's decision 
provides a third party with the kind of absolute and possibly 
arbitrary veto which Danforth had declared unconstitutional. 75 
The requirement that the court base its decision solely on the 
minor's best interests did not save the statute. That standard was 
considered to provide insufficient guidance to the judge, causing 
the decision to "necessarily reflect personal and societal values 
and mores whose enforcement upon the minor - particularly 
when contrary to her own informed and reasonable decision - is 
fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underlying the con-
stitutional protection afforded to her decisions."78 More precisely, 
the district court had held unconstitutional the statute's require-
ment that parents receive notice of all judicial proceedings insti-
tuted by minors to obtain abortions. 77 The two Supreme Court 
pluralities diverged in their response to this issue. Justice Stevens 
wrote that because the case involved an absolute third party veto 
and was governed by Danforth, "[n]either Danforth nor this case 
determines the constitutionality of a statute which does no more 
than require notice to the parents, without affording them or any 
other third party an absolute veto."78 
1• Id. at 3047. 
" Id. at 3048. 
75 Id. at 3052 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) & 3053 (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
" Id. at 3054 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). This defect, however, appears 
to be more theoretical than practical. A judge who decides that an abortion is not in a 
minor's best interests would be unlikely to conclude that the minor is mature and has 
made a reasonable decision, especially in the absence of an objective standard by which 
the minor's maturity can be determined. 
77 Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (D. Mass. 1978), af/'d, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979). 
" Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. at 3053 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Justice Powell, however, agreed with the district court that the 
uniform notice requirement unconstitutionally burdened minors' 
rights. The opinion recognized that pregnant minors, particularly 
those living at home, would be vulnerable to parental efforts to 
prevent an abortion or access to a court in pursuit of an abortion. 
This potential obstruction led Justice Powell to the conclusion 
that state regulation similar to that of Massachusetts must allow 
minors to obtain judicial consent to an abortion and to act on that 
authorization without prior parental notice. 79 
In Carey v. Population Services International, 80 the validity of 
a New York statute that, in part, prohibited all distribution or 
sale of contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen was 
challenged. In a plurality opinion, Justices Brennan, Stewart, 
Marshall, and Blackmun, with Justices White, Powell and Ste-
vens concurring in the result, held the statute unconstitutional. 
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan, noted that 
"the right of privacy in connection with decisions affecting pro-
creation extends to minors as well as adults."81 The opinion found 
two flaws in the statute - the absolute nature of the ban, and 
the lack of any evidence supporting the state's assertion that the 
ban furthered the goal of deterring sexual activity among minors. 
In dealing with the absolute prohibition Justice Brennan rea-
soned: "Since the State may not impose a blanket prohibition, 
or even a blanket requirement of parental consent, on the choice 
of a minor to terminate her pregnancy, the constitutionality of a 
blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to mi-
nors is a fortiori foreclosed. "82 The statute was also found to be 
both an ineffective and improper means of furthering the asserted 
state interest. Although the opinion did not pass on the question 
of whether and to what extent the state may regulate private 
sexual activity, it rejected the argument that the state may dis-
courage such activity by increasing the risks involved, especially 
in light of "a conceded complete absence of supporting evidence" 
that the regulation in fact deterred any sexual activity.83 
The plurality opinion, citing Danforth, stated that restrictions 
" Id. at 3050 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). 
'° 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
" Id. at 693. 
" Id. at 694. Justice Powell concurred in the result on the grounds that the statute 
violated the rights of married women aged fourteen to sixteen, and also violated the rights 
of parents to provide their minor children with contraceptives. Id. at 707-08 (Powell, J., 
concurring in result). 
" Id. at 696. Justice Stevens noted, "It is as though a State decided to dramatize its 
disapproval of motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety helmets. One need not posit a 
constitutional right to ride a motorcycle to characterize such a restriction as irrational and 
perverse." Id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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on minors' privacy rights need to be justified only by a showing 
of a "significant state interest" rather than a "compelling state 
interest."84 The less demanding test was found appropriate be-
cause of the state's traditionally greater latitude in regulating 
minors' activities and the status of minors' capacity in decisions 
regarding abortion and contraceptives.85 The meaning of the 
"significant state interest" test is unclear, but it apparently is a 
functional equivalent of the stricter standard. 86 
Another way to view the relationship between minors' funda-
mental rights and the regulatory latitude of the state is to recog-
nize that the state possesses certain interests which are 
"compelling" only with respect to minors. The significant state 
interest test implies that minors' fundamental rights are qualita-
tively inferior to those of adults. Maintenance of the compelling 
state interest test would focus on the relationship between the 
minor's maturity and the exercise of the restricted right as well 
as the impact of the relationship on the asserted state interest. 
The emphasis on the minor's capacity would be appropriate, 
since it is the minor's presumed lack of capacity that justifies all 
limits on the rights of minors qua minors.87 
This analysis also turns on the nature of the asserted right. One 
commentator has generally classed the fundamental rights in-
volved in minors' rights cases as "protection" and "choice" 
"' Id. at 693 & 693 n.15 . 
.. Id. at 693 n.15. 
" Id. at 706 (Powell, J., concurring in result): "Until today, I would not have thought 
it was . . . necessary to review state regulation of this sort under a standard that for all 
practical purposes approaches the 'compelling state interest' standard." 
87 In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), Justice Stewart expressed the view that 
[t]he Constitution guarantees, in short, a society of free choice. Such a society 
presupposes the capacity of its members to choose .... I think a State may 
permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child 
... is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the 
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only upon such a premise, I 
should suppose, that a State may deprive children of other rights-the right to 
marry, for example, or the right to vote-deprivations that would be constitution-
ally intolerable for adults. 
Id. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., concurring in result) (footnotes omitted); accord, Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 75, 104-05 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
Justice Stewart's analysis suggests that the crucial issue in determining the rights of 
minors is what type and level of capacity constitutes the capacity presupposed by consti-
tutional guarantees. In the context of access to contraceptives, the capacity to conceive a 
child is clearly relevant. Arguments that additional qualities of emotional or psychological 
maturity should be considered critical appear to be aimed at controlling sexual behavior 
rather than contraceptive choices alone and presuppose a causal link between the availa-
bility of contraceptives and sexual activity. As noted previously, however, there is no 
evidence supporting that assumption with respect to minors in general. See note 33 and 
accompanying text supra. 
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rights. 88 "Protection rights," generally, are those which shield an 
individual from undue harm or interference by the state or other 
individuals. "Choice rights" protect the individual's ability to 
make affirmative choices of "binding consequences," such as 
rights to vote, to contract, or to marry.89 
The Supreme Court's decisions regarding minors' rights in ju-
venile court and school disciplinary proceedings90 show the influ-
ence of these considerations. Due process concerns protect indi-
viduals from abuses of state power and improve the fairness of 
adversary adjudications. Thus, due process rights are of relatively 
constant value regardless of the individual party's maturity. The 
value of restrictions placed on choice rights, however, obviously 
does vary directly with levels of maturity. 
Minors' rights of access to contraceptives and abortions com-
bine qualities of both choice and protection rights. To the extent 
that the availability of contraceptives or abortions influences 
minors' decisions about sexual activity, the relevant privacy right 
functions as a choice right. Insofar as minors' sexual activities are 
not precipitated by access to contraceptives or abortions, the 
right of access serves to protect minors from themselves in an area 
in which they are uniquely capable of minimizing the conse-
quences of possibly immature and incorrect choices. When one 
recognizes the general lack of causality between minors' sexual 
activity and access to contraceptives, 91 and the significant dan-
gers of deterring minors from using contraceptives without also 
deterring their sexual activities, it appears especially unreasona-
ble to subject only those minors who act responsibly by seeking 
contraceptives to a uniform parental notification requirement. 
Minors who do not use contraceptives or rely on non-medical 
means would be unaffected by the requirement-they would not 
be induced to consult their parents or to change their sexual 
behavior or contraceptive choices. With respect to those sexually 
active minors who do use contraceptives, the right of access serves 
a definite prophylactic function against the undesirable conse-
quences to the minors and society in general. The dominance of 
the protective aspects of the privacy right suggests that capacity 
requirements be minimized and that limitations on minors' ac-
cess to contraceptives be justified by clear evidence that the limi-
tations would achieve their intended goals significantly more fre-
88 Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About 
Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 BRIG. YOUNG L. REv. 605, 644 (1976). 
" Id. at 644. 
'° See cases cited in notes 54-55 supra. 
11 See note 33 supra. 
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quently than they would increase the risks of irreparable harm to 
minors and society. 
C. Parental Rights and the Limitation of Minors' Rights 
The rights of parents to control their children must be weighed 
against the privacy rights of minors.92 In cases where parental 
rights have conflicted with state regulations, the Supreme Court 
has usually favored parental rights. In these cases, where the 
Court has affirmed the fundamental nature of parental rights, the 
state had completely pre-empted parental authority. In Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 93 the Court invalidated a state law requiring 
parents to send their children to public schools. The Court found 
that the state had no power to "standardize" children in that 
fashion: "The child is not the mere creature of the State; those 
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled 
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligations."94 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 95 the Court upheld the 
rights of Amish parents to refuse to send their children to high 
school in defiance of a state law requiring minors to attend school 
until age sixteen. Pierce was interpreted by the Court in Yoder 
to stand "as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the reli-
gious upbringing of their children."98 The cultural foundation of 
parental rights was explicitly recognized: "The history and cul-
ture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of. parental 
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This 
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is 
now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradi-
tion. " 97 
The source of parental rights recognized by the Court in these 
cases, however, is ill-defined. The rights could be derived from 
the right of the family as a unit to be free from undue state 
interference. Alternatively, parents could have certain rights to 
control their children that are independent of minors' rights and 
exist apart from the authority delegated to parents by the state 
to safeguard the social interest in minors' welfare. The ambiguity 
results in part from the presumed identity of interests between 
parents and children in these cases and the consequent lack of 
consideration of minors' rights as independent checks on parental 
12 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). 
13 268 U.S. 510 (1925) . 
. " Id. at 535. 
•• 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
,. Id. at 233. 
" Id. at 232. 
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rights, 98 and in part from the extent of the contested regulatory 
interference with the rights of both parents and minors. It is 
interesting to note that both Pierce and an earlier case, Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 99 rested on due process grounds rather than free exer-
cise of religion claims. Meyer stated that the due process clause 
protected the parents' right to hire a foreign language instructor 
for their children and the teacher's right to teach as within the 
"liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment, while Pierce 
stated that the inability of the state to require that all minors 
attend public schools exclusively was due to limits placed on the 
state by "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all 
governments in this Union repose. " 100 
The Court has since made it clear, however, that the family and 
parental authority are not completely free from state regulation. 
In Prince v. Massachusetts, 101 the Court upheld a statute prohib-
iting minors from selling newspapers or magazines in the streets 
and adults from giving minors articles to sell, as it applied to a 
Jehovah's Witness who was enthusiastically accompanied by her 
ward-niece while she sold religious literature on the streets. The 
Court rejected the argument that the law unconstitutionally lim-
ited the free exercise and expression rights of both the adult and 
the minor and the guardian's right of control and education. Al-
though the Court acknowledged the primary role of parents in 
childrearing, it noted that "the family itself is not beyond regula-
tion in the public interest, as against a claim of religious lib-
erty .... [A]nd neither rights or religion nor rights of parent-
hood are beyond limitation."102 In Yoder, the Court observed that 
state regulation of parental power and free exercise interests 
could meet the compelling state interest test "if it appears that 
parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, 
or have a potential for significant social burdens." 103 
18 In Yoder, the Court rejected Justice Douglas' argument that the case involved the 
rights of Amish minors apart from their parents' rights, on the basis that (1) the children 
were not parties to the litigation, (2) Wisconsin had not argued that the parents were 
preventing children who wanted to attend high school from doing so, and (3) Wisconsin 
was attempting to enforce penalties against the parents without regard to the children's 
wishes. The Court recognized that, had Wisconsin asserted an interest in protecting Amish 
minors who wished to attend public school, "[r ]ecognition of the claim of the State in 
such a proceeding would . . . call into question traditional concepts of parental control 
over the religious upbringing and education of their minor children recognized in this 
Court's past decisions." 406 U.S. at 231. 
,. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a state statute prohibiting instruction in foreign 
languages to anyone not yet graduated from the eighth grade). 
100 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
101 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
102 Id. at 166. 
103 406 U.S. at 233-34. 
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III. BALANCING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS 
The Supreme Court has clearly accepted the propositions that 
minors possess a fundamental right of privacy and that that right 
includes both the decision to prevent pregnancy and the decision 
to terminate pregn~ncy. 104 It has also, however, recognized that 
minors' rights of access to contraceptives may be limited by the 
state in furthering its own "significant" or "compelling" inter-
ests, or in protecting superior parental rights. The state could 
decide instead, however, that the general welfare would be bene-
fited more if contraceptives were available to minors on the same 
basis as to adults. 
The right of minors to obtain contraceptives should be ac-
corded the same weight against competing state interests as the 
corresponding adult right of access. As Justice Powell noted in 
Bellotti, the dangers of sexual activity without contraception are 
at least as great to minors as to unmarried adults, and the indi-
vidual's interest in controlling the decision to conceive a child is 
not totally dependent on the individual's age or maturity .105 Al-
though the contraception decision involves capacity to make 
medical decisions, the state's requirement of medical consulta-
tion and prescription as a condition of access to potentially harm-
ful methods minimizes the significance of the user's lack of capac-
ity in the exercise of this aspect of the privacy right. 
The interests of the state may be thought to be best protected 
by recognition of minors' right of access without parental notice. 
The extension of minors' rights would effectively further state 
interests in minimizing the social costs of teenagers' sexual activ-
ity. The lack of any evidence indicating that the availability of 
contraceptives causes any increase in the overall rate of minors' 
sexual activity leads to the conclusion that morally neutral, utili-
tarian principles about contraception support a state's position 
favoring minors' rights over parental rights in this context. 106 
The source of parental rights may influence the weight they are 
to be given when balanced against minors' rights or the state's 
perception of its own interests. To the extent that parental rights 
are based on a delegation of authority by the state, parental rights 
are less persuasive against state limitation based on determina-
tions of general welfare. Some aspects of parental rights are 
clearly subordinate to such legislative decisions concerning what 
10
• Carey v. Population Servs. Int'!, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. 
Accord, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
00
' Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3048 (1979). 
,.. See note 33 supra. 
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the public interest requires. For example, legislation lowering the 
age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen is within the consti-
tutional power of the state, although such legislation completely 
eliminates parental rights over certain children. Insofar as paren-
tal rights are derived from rights protected from state interfer-
ence, such as due process rights or "a right of privacy older than 
the Bill of Rights," 107 however, those rights must be given priority 
over at least some arguments based on general welfare determina-
tions. 
Parental rights and those state interests asserted to justify a 
notice requirement must also be valued in light of the efficacy of 
the chosen means and other foreseeable effects. Regardless of the 
level of interest the state may ultimately be required to show, 
regulations concerning notification must still employ means 
which are necessary to, and capable of, achieving their goal. 108 
Therefore, whether the state is attempting to further its goals, or 
to protect parents' interests, the means used must be reasonably 
related to the goal sought without unduly burdening minors' pri-
vacy rights. 
Since the available evidence indicates that the availability of 
contraceptives does not affect most minors' decisions about their 
sexual activities, a notice requirement would be essentially a 
method of propaganda. It would be merely an expression of social 
disapproval of minors' sexual activity and of support of parental 
authority. 109 It would communicate that disapproval without con-
trolling minors' behavior, since the choice to consult with parents 
would still remain exclusively with minors. The requirement 
would not do anything directly to alter parent-child relationships 
in ways that might encourage greater communication. With the 
variety of options available to minors, 110 the incentive for minors 
to consult with parents would be extremely weak. Such an effort 
to communicate disapproval must be justified by a compelling or 
significant state interest if its result is substantially to burden or 
deter the exercise of minors' right of access to contraceptives, 
thereby randomly increasing the risks of pregnancy to minors. 111 
"' Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
"' Carey, 431 U.S. at 686; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 
179 (1973) (invalidating abortion procedure requirements beyond the attending physi-
cian's approval). 
'°' See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra. 
110 See text accompanying note 35 supra. 
111 Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 (majority opinion) & 715 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972). With respect to the standard of review 
involved, the Carey Court said: 
[T]he same test must be applied to state regulations that burden an individual's 
right to decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by substantially 
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It appears likely that a significant number of minors would 
rather take the risks of unprotected intercourse than confront 
their parents with their sexual activities. 112 State legislatures have 
already recognized the strength of minors' desires for privacy and 
the potential of parental involvement for counterproductive de-
terrence in sex-related matters by permitting minors by statute 
to consent to treatment for venereal disease. 113 These provisions 
implicitly recognize that too many minors, knowing they have a 
venereal disease and cognizant of its dangers, will not ask their 
parents for assistance. The dangers of not using contraceptives 
are less certain and more avoidable than those of venereal dis-
ease. Even though a notice provision is superficially not as strong 
a barrier to access to contraceptives as a consent requirement is 
to venereal disease treatment, minors may be more willing to 
forego contraceptives than medical treatment. From the minor's 
viewpoint, parents would be more likely to react favorably to a 
request for venereal disease treatment than to notice of the 
minor's sexual activities. 
A notice requirement is equally unlikely to protect state and 
parental interests in the quality and stability of family relation-
ships or parents' moral authority. The lack of a notice require-
ment would not prevent parents or children from raising any 
issues for family discussion. With respect to a minor's sex life, the 
choice whether to involve the parents in any way remains within 
the minor's control despite any parental notice requirements. 
The limitations on minors' i'ights are justified by a desire to 
minimize the possibility of harm to minors in certain situations. 
The limitations are implemented through either a state-
mandated choice or by delegation of the right of choice to parents. 
The interest in a correct medical choice involved in the contra-
ceptive decision is best served by the assistance of a physician; 
it is doubtful that parental advice would improve such a medical 
decision. The value of parental involvement is further weakened 
by the relatively small medical risks to the minor posed by con-
traceptives and the reversibility of the decision. The function of 
limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state 
statutes that prohibit the decision entirely. Both types of regulation "may be 
justified only by a •~ompelling state interest' ... and ... must be narrowly 
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." 
431 U.S. at 688 (citation omitted). 
112 Torres, supra note 35. 
113 See, e.g., Amz. REV. STAT. § 44-132.01 (1978-79 Supp.); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-629, 
82-630 & 82-631 (1976); CAL. C1v. CODE § 34.7 (West Supp. 1979); Cow. REV. STAT. 
§ 25-4-402 (1973); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-89a (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 13 
§ 708 (1974). See also Paul, Pilpel & Wechsler, Pregnancy, Teenagers and the Law, 1976, 
8 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 16 (1976). 
FALL 1979] Parental Notification 223 
the minor's privacy right as a protection against the undesired 
consequences of sexual activity and the possibility of negative 
parental reactions support the minimization of any capacity re-
quirement and for allowing parental involvement to be the result 
of the natural development of parent-child relations. The only 
reasonable level of capacity required to make a contraceptive 
decision in consultation with a physician is the capacity to expose 
oneself to the risks guarded against by contraception. There is no 
reason to believe that state-mandated parental involvement in 
the minor's contraceptive decision will enhance parental author-
ity or the parent-child relationship if the minor does not already 
trust the parents enough to confide voluntarily in them. Thus, the 
minor's interest in avoiding pregnancy, venereal disease or other, 
adverse consequences, should outweigh the state's and parents' 
interests in the minor's use of contraceptives and the speculative 
benefits expected from parental involvement in the contraceptive 
decision. 114 
CONCLUSION 
A requirement that parents be notified of their minor children's 
use of or desire to use contraceptives fails to serve any significant 
state interest in deterring the sexual activity of minors and fails 
to protect the interests of parents and the state in the minor's 
welfare, parental authority, or family stability. A notice require-
ment - and any other more restrictive regulations - rather only 
would increase the risks to minors of pregnancy and venereal 
disease, with their consequent personal and social costs. It is 
understandable and laudable that parents would want to be in-
volved in guiding their children's decisions about sex and contra-
ceptives. Parents, however, should look to themselves to establish 
sufficiently strong relationships with their children to make state 
intervention unnecessary. The state has less burdensome meth-
ods available to protect its interests, such as sex education pro-
grams in public schools. The privacy rights of minors to prevent 
conception should be protected against state or parental infringe-
ment through such an empty symbolic measure as a notification 
requirement. 
-Michael N. Finger 
"' Cf. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75: "Any independent interest the parent may have in the 
termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of 
privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant." 

